This paper models the disclosure of knowledge via licensing to outsiders or fringe …rms as a threat, useful in ensuring …rms keep their commitments. We show that …rms holding intellectual property are better able to enforce agreements than …rms that don't. In markets requiring innovation to make a product, IP disclosure presents a more powerful threat than entry by the punishing …rm alone. Occasionally, a punishing …rm won't be able to translate its intellectual property into a full-blown product, making it impossible for it to enter the cheating …rm's market and punish. Even if it can't make a product itself, the punishing …rm can always credibly threaten to license the intellectual property it has on hand to someone else. With this intellectual property as a springboard, chances are at least one fringe …rm will be able to do the translation, make the product and enter the cheating …rm's market. In short, the potential for licensing increases the likelihood of punishment for uncooperative behavior. In the model, …rms contract explicitly to exchange knowledge and tacitly to coordinate the introduction of innovations to the marketplace. We …nd conditions under which …rms can self-enforce both agreements. The enforcement conditions are weaker when (1) …rms possess knowledge and (2) knowledge is easily transferable to other …rms. The disclosure threat has implications for antitrust law generally, which are considered.
Introduction
Once released, information is the quintessential public good. It is non-rival -my use of information does not prevent others from using that same information. It is non-exclusive. Absent some legal rights or expensive self-help, one can't easily exclude someone else from using information. The familiar argument is that intellectual property rights respond to the unique character of information. Patent, copyright, and trade secret all give innovators some ex post control over their creation. The assumption is that, without some control, the eventual appropriation of the information will stunt its development. Yet the non-rival and non-exclusive nature of information leads to another consequence under-appreciated in the academic literature or intellectual property policy debates. The same characteristics that make information-creation problematic also render the disclosure of information an e¤ective weapon for self-policing agreements.
To see why, consider a tacit agreement between two …rms to divide up markets. The standard story is that the threat of entry into the other …rm's market can maintain the market division agreement (see, for example, Calem [1988] and Bulow et. al [1985] ). But what if one …rm has capacity to only enter one market? In that case, the capacity constrained …rm lacks a credible entry threat and the market division agreement falls apart. Intellectual property as an essential input in production alters this story. Now even though the capacity constrained …rm can't enter its rival's market, any knowledge the …rm has can be sold to someone else. Because it is non-rival, information licensed to one …rm is never depleted. In other words, unlike physical capital, intellectual property doesn't depreciate. If the …rst …rm who buys a license fails to innovate, that same information can be licensed to a second …rm. If the second …rm fails to innovate, the information can be sold to a third …rm. And so on. By repeated disclosures, a …rm can guarantee that some …rm will innovate, build a competing product, and enter the market of a counter-party that reneges on its promises. The fear of license-induced entry, then, provides an incentive for each …rm to keep its word. Simply put, knowledge disclosure works as an e¤ective hammer to punish deviations from both express and implied agreements between …rms whose business model is based on intellectual property. As a result, …rms holding intellectual property …nd enforcing agreements -whether those agreements are pro-competitive or anti-competitive-easier than …rms that don't. The power of the disclosure threat depends on two factors: (1) the degree to which knowledge can be easily transferred between …rms, that is, how easy it is to learn what another …rm knows; and (2) the number of fringe …rms willing and able to bring a product to market if given the essential intellectual property.
Better enforcement works for good and ill. On the plus side of the ledger, the threat of disclosure means that joint ventures where …rms exchange knowledge can be self-executing. Firms don't need the courts (Posner, R. [2006] and Shavell [1980] ) or reputational sanctions (Bernstein [1992] , Posner, E. [1998] and Klein and Le-er [1981] ) to generate compliance with contractual obligations to share know-how. The end result is more joint ventures, more knowledge sharing, and more new products. On the minus side of the ledger, tacit agreements to divide up markets are also self-executing. As a result, there is an increased risk of collusion where …rms have information that could be released upon observing a deviation from a tacit agreement.
The antitrust rami…cations of this latter point suggest care in the treatment of R&D joint ventures. Although the potential anti-competitive e¤ects of such agreements are well-known, the literature has focused on ancillary clauses in the agreement itself, such as promises to share price information (Grossman and Shapiro [1986] ), or promises to cross-license at supracompetitive rates (Shapiro [1985] and Katz and Shapiro [1985] ). Our model shows that the mere presence of intellectual property at the core of the business can facilitate collusive behavior.
The insights o¤ered here also provide a new rationale for the common practice of licensing technology on a non-exclusive basis to R&D joint ventures. The conventional wisdom is that …rms use non-exclusive licenses because they don't want to tie up knowledge assets in the joint venture, especially if the technology might be useful for unrelated projects. Our model shows that the non-exclusive license serves another purpose: maintaining the intellectual property disclosure threat. The non-exclusive license is equivalent to loading a gun, ready to be discharged if participants in the joint venture fail to uphold their end of the bargain.
The model considers two R&D …rms ahead of the competition in two innovation markets. The …rms form an R&D joint venture. In this venture, they write an explicit contract to share knowledge. If possible, the …rms would also like to tacitly divvy-up the two markets. That is, each …rm wants to focus on developing one of the two possible innovations. As an example, consider two technology …rms forming a joint venture. Each …rm licenses its technology to the joint venture, allowing the joint venture to use the knowledge whether protected by patent or trade secret. This knowledge can be the basis of a variety of potential products, from a new cell-phone to a higher-speed computer to a higher de…nition ‡at screen television. Market entry demands incorporating the technology into an innovative new product. Each …rm might be able to innovate and produce the product without access to the other …rm's technology. What access does is increase the chance of a successful innovation. The exchange of knowledge is tough to verify and, as a result, non-contractible. Under these circumstances, each …rm has an incentive to withhold information from its counter-party. By withholding, a …rm bene…ts from the other …rm's knowledge, while at the same time maintaining an edge in the race to innovate.
Two mechanisms sustain both the explicit joint venture contract and the tacit market coordination agreement. If a …rm observes its rival failing to comply with its obligations it either (1) enters and competes in the renegade's market in all the subsequent periods or (2) releases information through licensing. The …rst threat is a variant on the grim trigger strategy in repeated games (Friedman [1971] ). Whether the threat controls deviations depends on the relationship between the gain to a one time deviation and the …rm's discount rate. The more interesting second strategy -IP disclosure -is credible because it is only carried out when the punishing …rm is unable to innovate on its own in the renegade's market. In that case, the punishing …rm engages in sequential licensing to fringe …rms until one fringe …rm can innovate. The transfer of intellectual property provides fringe …rms a gateway into the renegade's market.
Our paper relates to a large literature on the strategic transfer of knowledge. Anton and Yao [1994] analyze a pro-competitive e¤ect of information disclosure. They study the problem facing an inventor who wants to transfer knowledge in the absence of property rights. Without IP rights, contracts don't work. Any knowledge transfer will be snapped up and then the purchaser won't pay. They show that the inventor will be nonetheless able to protect his property rights by credibly threatening the buyer to disclose information to a market rival. In another set of papers, Anton and Yao [2002] and [2003] provide another justi…cation for IP disclosure: expropriable partial disclosure can be used to credibly signal the quality of an inventor's innovation. Our model focuses on disclosures by symmetric …rms, rather than private disclosures by an inventor. We show that threats of knowledge disclosure can ensure compliance with both pro-competitive and anti-competitive agreements between …rms. The threat of disclosure facilitates knowledge sharing by …rms, a pro-competitive e¤ect, but it also makes it easier for …rms to divide-up the innovation markets, an anti-competitive e¤ect.
Also close to the concerns here is the large literature on licensing. This literature often addresses the relationship between licensing and the speed of innovation (see, e.g., Katz and Shapiro [1988] ). Other times, authors are concerned with what structures the terms of the licensing agreement. For example, Gans and Stern [2000] study bargaining over the licensing terms between an incumbent and a potential entrant with a technological innovation. They …nd that an incumbent might, under certain conditions, invest in R &D purely to improve their position in the licensing negotiation. d 'Aspremont et al. [2000] study the sharing of interim research knowledge between two …rms engaged in a patent race. There, because of the nature of information, they …nd that the non-informed agent is able to obtain full disclosure of the informed party's knowledge, while forfeiting none of the gains from trade to the informed seller. Bhattacharya and Guriev [2006] consider two R &D …rms deciding how to sell their ideas to development …rms. The potential for leakage of knowledge in the patent process pushes …rms toward protecting knowledge through trade secrets. Bhattacharya et al. [1992] explore two licensing contacts that ensure e¢ cient sharing of knowledge and e¢ cient expenditures on R &D. Like most of this literature, we focus on a special characteristics of knowledge: the ability to license the same knowledge to multiple actors. In our model, it is this characteristic that makes it easier to sustain cooperative behavior between …rms.
Finally, our paper connects with the literature on multimarket contact. Bernheim and Whinston [1990] were among the …rst to explore the e¤ect of multimarket contact on collusive behavior. They showed that multimarket contact may enhance the …rms' ability to collude when the …rms or the markets are asymmetric. We focus on symmetric …rms and markets, and show that multimarket contact and the ability to disclose information via licensing to fringe …rms facilitate knowledge sharing and market division.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model; in the …rst round two leading R&D …rms decide whether to share knowledge, and in the second round they play an entry game in two potential markets. Section 3 studies the entry game. It shows that market coordination (each …rm cornering one market) is easier to sustain if a …rm can use the threat of disclosing intellectual property in the other …rm's market, when it is not able to enter itself. Section 4 studies knowledge sharing agreements. It shows that when the threat of IP disclosure is available, it is also easier for …rms to share knowledge prior to divvying up the markets. Section 5 examines some of the legal implications and welfare e¤ects of the IP disclosure threat. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The Model
There are two …rms (i 2 f1; 2g) competing in two innovation markets (j 2 fA; Bg). Each …rm may be able to introduce an innovation in each of the two markets. Thus, there are four potential innovations, or products. The two innovations in a market are substitutes. One can think of …rms 1 and 2 as the leading …rms in two particular research and development markets. There also exist potential start-up …rms which may be able to enter either market A or B. The precise notion of the start-up …rms and entry will be formalized later. Let m j be the total number of innovations introduced in market j and denote with V j i (m j ) the value to …rm i, in each of an in…nite number of periods, of introducing an innovation in market j as a function of the total number of innovations. Thus, letting be the common discount factor, the discounted payo¤ to …rm i of introducing an innovation in a market with m j innovations is V (m j )= (1 ). To simplify the exposition, assume symmetry of the two markets and the …rms'payo¤ functions:
for all i and all j. We deliberately use the reduced form V (m j ) for the stage payo¤s, in order to abstract from the …rms'pricing strategies, and focus instead on their information sharing, licensing and entry strategies.
The timing of the game is as follows: First, …rms decide whether to form a joint venture and privately share their knowledge about technology in the two markets. A …rm's knowledge determines the probability with which it can innovate in a market. Second, each …rm learns whether it actually can bring a product to market. For simplicity we assume that whether a …rm can bring a product to market is publicly known.
More precisely, we assume that in each time period t 1 of the entry game, …rms decide simultaneously whether to enter an innovation market that they have not entered before and whether to license any of their knowledge to the fringe …rms. Figure 1 illustrates the extensive form of the game.
We solve the game by backward induction, considering …rst the equilibrium in the market entry game and then equilibrium where an agreement to share know how precedes the market entry game. Our plan is to show how, at each stage, …rms holding knowledge can better coordinate their activities than …rms without knowledge.
Licensing and the Value of Innovations
Naturally, …rms with more knowledge have a greater probability of being able to innovate. To capture this idea in the simplest possible way, we assume that a leading …rm can develop an innovation with probability p l using only its own knowledge, while it is able to develop the innovation with probability p h , with p h > p l , when it also has access to the knowledge of the other leading …rm. We will say that a …rm with access only to its own knowledge has a low knowledge level, while it has a high knowledge level if it has access to both technologies.
Knowledge disclosure and licensing play a critical role in the analysis. In each market, there exists n j fringe …rms. Without any knowledge transfer from the leading …rms, none of them can innovate. Because knowledge transfer from a leading …rm to a fringe …rm might be imperfect, fringe …rms can innovate with probability p f p l when given access to a leading …rm's technology.
2
Licensing to a fringe …rm takes on the following form. The leading …rm o¤ers the information or technology. If it is able to innovate, the fringe …rm pays a fee which is a fraction of its stream of pro…ts,
. If the fringe …rm is unable to innovate, it pays nothing. If it decides to license, the leading …rm keeps o¤ering exclusive licenses to fringe …rms until at least one …rm can innovate and then stops. Thus, when a single leading …rm 2 It would seem plausible to assume that if the licensing …rm has access to the other leading …rm's technology, then the probability p h f that a fringe …rm innovates after licensing is higher than the probability p l f that it innovates after licensing from a leading …rm with low knowledge. This assumption would complicate the notation without a¤ecting any of the results, provided that the di¤erence between p l f and p h f is not too large. To simplify the notation, we assume that p
licenses, the probability that at least one fringe …rm will be able to innovate is 1 = 1 (1 p f ) n j , which converges to one as the fringe becomes large (i.e., as n j ! 1). We can think of = 0 as the special case in which the leading …rm freely and publicly discloses its knowledge.
When both leading …rms license to the fringe, the probability that at least two fringe …rms will be able to innovate (and hence both leading …rms will be able to collect their pro…t shares) is 2 = 1 (1 p f )
n j 1 . The probability that only one fringe …rm will be able to innovate is 1 2 ; in such a case each leading …rm is equally likely to be the one to license. Hence, the probability that each leading …rm will receive its pro…t share from the only innovating fringe …rm is 1 2
( 1 2 ) : In any market, each …rm's innovation or product is a substitute for the other …rms'innovation. With more …rms in a market, there are more substitute innovations competing for consumer demand. The increased competition lowers each …rm's pro…t in that market. Formally, let V (m) > V (m + 1). Finally, we assume that monopoly pro…t is higher than total duopoly pro…t, V (1) > 2V (2). To make our analysis more concrete, consider, as an example, …rms introducing identical innovations into two symmetric Cournot oligopoly markets. Then our reduced form assumptions on V hold. For example, with linear demand and constant marginal cost we have V (m) = (A c) 2 =b(m+1) 2 , where A is the vertical intercept and b is the slope of the demand function, while c is marginal cost. Our assumptions also hold if …rms compete in prices, provided products are not perfectly homogeneous.
Market Entry
To begin the analysis, it is useful to delineate the behavior in the market entry game subgames. Figure 2 lists the possible subgame con…gurations.
(1) Firm 1 and Firm 2 can innovate in both markets (2) Firm 1 and Firm 2 can only innovate in the same one market (3) Firm 1 can innovate in one market; Firm 2 can innovate in the other market (4) Firm 1 can innovate in one market; Firm 2 can innovate in both markets (5) Firm 1 can innovate in both markets; Firm 2 can innovate in one market (6) At least one of the two …rms cannot innovate in any markets Absent the threat of licensing, subgame con…guration (2)-(6) have a unique subgame perfect equilibria in which each …rm enters a market at time t = 1 if it is able to develop the innovation in that market. (Recall that a …rm cannot enter a market unless it is able to develop an innovation.) In these subgames, the …rms can't coordinate -one entering market A and the other entering market B. The reason is that the entry threat needed to maintain agreement is not credible. Suppose that …rm 1 can only develop in market A, while …rm 2 can develop in markets A and B. Can the …rms agree that …rm 1 will introduce its innovation in market A and …rm B will introduce its innovation in market B only? No. Firm 2 will always deviate and enter market A, too. It faces no retribution from doing so. Firm 1 can't punish …rm 2's behavior because it is unable to innovate and enter market B. That all changes when the threat of IP disclosure is available; then market entry coordination is possible in subgame con…gurations (3)-(5).
When IP disclosure is not possible, entry coordination is only possible in subgame con…guration (1). There, both …rms are able to develop an innovation in both markets. In this case there are two di¤erent types of subgame perfect equilibria with no entry delay (or immediate entry). 3 In the …rst type of equilibrium, both …rms enter both markets immediately. In the second type of equilibrium, …rms coordinate: One …rm enters market A immediately and the other enters market B immediately. This second type of equilibrium, however, only exists if the discount rate is su¢ ciently high. Before formalizing this result in the next proposition, de…ne:
Proposition 1 Suppose IP disclosure is not possible. When each leading …rm can develop an innovation in both markets, the entry game has two types of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes with immediate entry. In the …rst equilibrium outcome, both …rms enter both markets. This type of equilibrium always exists. In the second equilibrium outcome, each leading …rm enters a di¤erent market. This type of equilibrium exists if and only if 1 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result is standard. If the discount factor is low (below 1 ), there does not exist any equilibrium of the market entry subgame where …rms can successfully enforce an agreement to coordinate market entry decisions. The impatient …rm values the one-time bump in pro…ts from deviating on the market division agreement more than the stream of losses from competing in both markets in every future period. On the other hand, when the …rms are su¢ ciently patient, enforcement of the tacit agreement is possible. Now allow for knowledge disclosure and licensing. Licensing increases the number of subgames where the …rms can coordinate their actions. Before getting to the proposition that shows this result, de…ne 2 as
Proposition 2 Suppose IP disclosure and licensing are possible. There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the entry game in which each leading …rm enters a di¤erent market in the following scenarios: (1) When one …rm can develop an innovation in one market and the other …rm can develop an innovation in both markets; (2) when each leading …rm can develop an innovation in both markets; and (3) when one …rm can develop an innovation in one market only and the other …rm can develop an innovation only in the other market. This equilibrium exists if and only if 2 .
Proof: See the Appendix A few remarks are worth making here. First, whether this equilibrium exists depends on 1 , the chance that licensing will result in fringe entry. As 1 gets smaller, the needed threshold value of 2 gets bigger. 1 depends on (1) the number of fringe …rms and (2) the success of the knowledge transfer, p f : In other words, the power of the licensing threat to enforce entry coordination turns on the ease of knowledge transfer and the depth of the fringe. Second, without disclosable intellectual property, cooperation is possible in just one of the six possible market entry subgames, and then only if the …rms are su¢ ciently patient. In contrast, with licensing, …rms can enforce cooperation in more subgames, in particular cooperation is possible where one …rm can enter both markets and the other …rm can enter one market only. Meanwhile, the threat of entry by a leading …rm continues to ensure cooperation where both …rms can enter both markets.
Knowledge Sharing and Market Entry
As in the previous section, we …rst look at the possible equilibria where …rms cannot license to the fringe and then compare those equilibria to the equilibria where the leading …rms can license. Without sharing of knowledge, each leading …rm i can only innovate with probability p l in each market. By sharing its knowledge a …rm raises the other leading …rm's probability of innovating to p h in both markets. In the …rst stage of the game, …rms simultaneously decide whether to share their knowledge. They have made a joint venture agreement and now must make sure that they bene…t from it. In the second stage, nature determines whether each …rm is able to develop the innovations with probability p l or p h , depending on the …rm's knowledge. We will look for the subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
The following threshold value of p l will be used in the next proposition, de…ning the equilibrium without disclosure:
Proposition 3 Without IP disclosure, there is no subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in which the leading …rms share knowledge if p l < p l , or if < 1 . If, on the other hand, p l p l and 1 , then there is an equilibrium in which the …rms share knowledge and each …rm enters a di¤erent market when both …rms can innovate in both markets.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To sustain the knowledge sharing agreement, each …rm credibly threatens to enter each market where it can develop an innovation if the rival …rm fails to share knowledge. For this threat to serve its purpose, a …rm must be able to innovate with su¢ ciently high probability, even if its rival does not share knowledge. That is to say, it must be p l p l . 4 The restrictions on p l makes it su¢ ciently likely the …rms will end up in a market entry subgame where both …rms can enter both markets. Only in this subgame can entry coordination occur and, accordingly, only then can …rms use threats to deviate from the coordinated scheme to punish a failure to share knowledge. In all other subgames, the …rms can't coordinate entry. If these other subgames are su¢ ciently likely, knowledge-sharing cannot be self-enforced, no matter how patient the …rms are. The chance of a …rm hurting itself by sharing knowledge is simply too high. Since a coordinated equilibrium is unlikely, by sharing knowledge a …rm just increases the likelihood that its rival will eventually enter more markets. The restriction 1 means that, once in the subgame where both …rms can enter both markets, the …rms are su¢ ciently patient to facilitate coordination. When p l < p l or < 1 ; …rms face a standard prisoner's dilemma. Both …rms would be better o¤ if they could commit to share knowledge and coordinate their entries in the markets. Nevertheless, this sort of cooperation is unobtainable. In equilibrium, each …rm has an incentive to take the knowledge shared by its rival, fail to return the favor, and then enter every innovation market it can.
By way of contrast, consider the case in which IP disclosure is possible. As shown in the previous section, licensing gives an additional punishing tool against renegate …rms, enlarging the number of subgames where cooperation can occur in the entry game. As a result, the licensing threat makes it easier to sustain knowledge sharing in a joint venture of the two leading …rms. Now if a leading …rm fails to share knowledge, the rival …rm can credibly threaten to license to a fringe …rm in all markets in which it cannot enter. This enhances the probability a …rm will experience punishment in the entry game after reneging on the knowledge-sharing agreement (punishment can be meted out in four subgames, rather than one subgame).
Proposition 4 Suppose IP disclosure and licensing are possible. There is a value p l < p h such that, if p l p l and 2 then there exists an equilibrium where …rms share knowledge and coordinate market entry (each leading …rm entering a di¤erent market) in the following scenarios: (1) When one …rm can develop an innovation in one market and the other …rm can develop an innovation in both markets; (2) when each leading …rm can develop an innovation in both markets; and (3) when one …rm can develop an innovation in one market only and the other …rm can develop an innovation only in the other market.
Proof. See the Appendix

Legal and Welfare Implications
Viewing the disclosure of intellectual property as a "threat"leads to a number of legal and welfare implications. First, R&D knowledge sharing agreements raise enforcement concerns. Such agreements must detail the knowledge to be shared (even if it isn't created yet). Inartful and imprecise contractual drafting can make it di¢ cult for courts to determine "breach," especially when the contract governs ever-evolving technology. Making enforcement more problematic is the presence of judges with little technology expertise or savvy. Our model shows that enforcement concerns are potentially overstated. The threat of intellectual property disclosure to fringe …rms can ensure compliance with knowledge-sharing commitments absent court intervention.
Second, antitrust o¢ cials worry about an increased chance of tacit collusion in evaluating mergers [1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines] . According to the guidelines, "whether a merger is likely to diminish competition by enabling …rms more likely, more successfully or more completely to engage in coordinated interaction depends on whether market conditions, on the whole, are conducive to reaching terms of coordination and detecting and punishing deviations from those terms." The model highlights a previously unrecognized factor in facilitating coordinated interaction: the presence of large amounts of disclosable intellectual property. Finally, the model sheds light on the proper antitrust treatment of R&D joint ventures. The welfare e¤ects of any R&D joint venture re ‡ect a balancing of interests. From a static viewpoint, knowledge sharing is always socially bene…cial, because it increases the chance of innovation in both markets. On the other hand, while we did not model it in this paper, the dynamic e¤ect of knowledge sharing is ambiguous, because the prospect of future knowledge sharing may reduce a …rm's incentive to invest in knowledge acquisition (i.e., R&D).
It is an open question whether the antitrust authority should prevent coordination in the entry decision. Typically market coordination reduces welfare, but the opposite is also possible. Welfare may increase if the reduction in consumers' surplus following market coordination is more than compensated by the increase in the …rm's pro…ts (e.g., this can happen if the …xed cost of entering a market is high). More interestingly, the prospect of future market coordination ought to strengthen the …rms' incentives to invest in R&D, and thus raise welfare by increasing the innovation rate. It is also important to note that allowing market coordination makes it easier for …rms to share knowledge, and this has a positive e¤ect on welfare.
Concluding Remarks
The model developed in this paper demonstrates how …rms can use the threat of licensing to fringe …rms as a mechanism to enforce agreements to exchange knowledge and coordinate entry decisions. For some parameter con…gura-tions, the threat of knowledge disclosure deters the breach of the explicit knowledge sharing agreement and the tacit market division agreement arising out of an R&D joint venture. Some insights gained from the model follow:
(1) Enforcing agreements -illegal and legal -is easier when the …rms have intellectual property that can be easily released to fringe …rms. (2) If technology is di¢ cult to transfer to other …rms, …rms don't have any technology to transfer, or there are few …rms able to innovate when given the technology, …rms will have greater di¢ culty self-policing their agreements. (3) If …rms are in the process of developing similar innovations, then the case is stronger for antitrust o¢ cials to deter market entry coordination, even at the cost of banning the joint venture altogether and thereby impeding knowledge sharing.
One …nal point is this: The joint venture antitrust analysis di¤ers when innovations are complementary. In that case, the payo¤ to a leading …rm that innovates in a market is higher if the other …rm also innovates. As a result, it is mutually bene…cial for both …rms to develop their innovations in any given market. For example, the maker of an allergy medicine with side-e¤ects prefers that a drug which mitigates those e¤ects also comes to market. An extreme example of complementary innovations is provided by two goods that consumers only value as a bundle (for example, compatible DVD disk players and DVD disks). When innovations are complementary, it is a dominant strategy for each …rm to share knowledge and enter any market where it can develop an innovation. There is no downside to sharing information; each …rm prefers that the complementary innovation come to market. Because consumers are also better o¤ when complementary innovations are produced, welfare increases under a joint venture. Thus there is no reason for the antitrust authority to prevent joint ventures to form when the leading …rms are developing complementary products.
This deviation is unpro…table if
, which holds whenever 2 . Firm 2's best deviation is to enter …rm 1's market immediately, provoking licensing by …rm 1 in the following period. This deviation results in a payo¤ of
. This deviation is unpro…table if 2 . In scenario (2), both …rms can enter both markets. By the same argument as in proposition 1, trigger strategies support the equilibrium where each …rm enters a di¤erent market. The punishment upon observing a deviation is the leading …rm's entry into the other market. This is clearly a better punishment strategy than licensing because the punishing …rm need not split the proceeds with the fringe …rm. Since 2 > 1 , a value 2 ensures this equilibrium exists.
In scenario (3), each …rm can enter a di¤erent market. The following strategy ensures that neither …rm licenses to the fringe: Do not license unless the rival …rm has licensed in the previous period. Each …rm's discounted payo¤ from this strategy is V (1)=(1 ): The best deviation for both …rms is to immediately license, resulting in a payo¤ of
, which holds whenever 2 :
Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 1 if < 1 , no coordination will take place in the entry game, and thus it is a dominant strategy for a …rm not to share knowledge (by bene…ting the rival, knowledge sharing can only hurt a …rm).
If 1 , information sharing can be part of an equilibrium if and only if it is coupled with coordination in the entry game. To sustain information sharing, each …rm should follow the strategy of sharing knowledge and then entering one of the two markets at t = 1 if (1) the rival also shared knowledge and (2) the rival can develop innovations in both markets. (Assume, w.l.o.g., that …rm 1 enters market A and …rm 2 enters market B.) Subgame perfection requires that at t = 1 a …rm enters all markets in which it can develop an innovation if the rival shared knowledge but cannot develop innovations in both markets. If the rival fails to share, then the …rm will enter any market where it can develop an innovation. Note that this is the most severe punishment that can be meted out to a …rm that fails to share, and thus it gives us the best option to sustain knowledge sharing in equilibrium. This strategy gives the …rm a discounted continuation equilibrium payo¤ U E , where
Failing to share knowledge yields the payo¤ U D , where
Simple algebra shows that U D U E if and only if p l p l , where
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
The following is an equilibrium strategy for …rm 1 (…rm 2's equilibrium strategy is similar).
In the …rst stage of the game: share knowledge with …rm 2. In the entry game:
If …rm 1 cannot innovate in either market: license in both markets.
If …rm 2, the other leading …rm, cannot innovate in either market: enter any market in which can innovate, license in any market in which cannot innovate.
If …rm 1 can innovate in only one market and …rm 2 can innovate in the other market: do not license if …rm 2 shared in the …rst stage and has not entered …rm 1's market; otherwise license.
If …rm 1 can innovate in both markets and …rm 2 can innovate in at least one market, say market B: enter market A only, unless …rm 2 licenses in that market, enters that market itself, or fails to share knowledge; otherwise enter both markets.
If …rm 1 can innovate in one market and …rm 2 can innovate in that same one market only: enter that market and license to the fringe in the other market.
From Proposition 2, we know that if s 2 , then …rms are able to coordinate market entry after having shared knowledge. It only remains to show that sharing knowledge is an equilibrium in the …rst stage of the game.
Suppose …rm 2 follows the equilibrium strategy. If …rm 1 also follow the equilibrium strategy and shares knowledge, its payo¤ is
where U E (i) is …rm 1's payo¤ when …rm 2 is able to innovate in i markets. It is:
(1 )U E (2) = p ( 1 2 )V (1) +(1 p h ) 2 2 2 V (2) + 1 2
( 1 2 )V (1)
= ;
If …rm 2 follows the equilibrium strategy, …rm 1's payo¤ from withholding knowledge is
where, as before, U D (i) is …rm 1's payo¤ when …rm 2 is able to innovate in i markets. It is:
(1 )U D (2) = p ( 1 2 ) V (1) +(1 p h ) 2 2 2 V (2) + 1 2
( 1 2 ) V (1)
Note that U D (1) > U D (2); since
